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EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering with convictions and pragmatism1
The Ethio-Eritrean war -  is often considered a turning point in the na-
tionalist discourse of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
and the main cause of the reactivation of a strong Pan-Ethiopian nationalism (here taken 
as synonymous with Ethiopianness , after the introduction of ethnic federalism  in 
. This paper argues that Pan-Ethiopian and ethnic  nationalism coexisted in TPLF-
EPRDF’s nationalism before the -  war. “s a political and pragmatic tool to grasp 
and keep power, the multifaceted  nationalism of the EPRDF was adapted and adjusted 
to new circumstances. This explains the ease with which Pan-Ethiopianism was reacti-
vated and reinvented from  onwards. In this process, the  general elections and 
the rise of opposition groups defending a Pan-Ethiopian nationalism also represented an 
important inluence in EPRDF’s nationalist adjustment.
Keywords: Ethiopia, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Ethiopianness, opposition
A EPRDF e a construção da nação: Ajustes nas convicções e pragmatismo
“ guerra Etiópia-Eritreia -  é frequentemente considerada um ponto de 
viragem no discurso nacionalista da Frente Democrática Revolucionária do Povo Etíope 
(EPRDF) e a principal causa da reativação de um forte nacionalismo pan-etíope (conside-
rado aqui como sinónimo de etiopianidade , após a introdução do federalismo étnico  
em . Este artigo argumenta que o nacionalismo pan-etíope e étnico  coexistiram no 
nacionalismo da TPLF-EPRDF antes da guerra de - . Como ferramenta política e 
pragmática para conquistar e manter o poder, o nacionalismo multifacetado  da EPRDF 
foi adaptado e ajustado às novas circunstâncias. Isso explica a fácil reativação e reinven-
ção do pan-etiopianismo a partir de . Neste processo, as eleições gerais de  e o 
surgimento de grupos de oposição que defendem um nacionalismo pan-etíope também 
representaram uma importante inluência no ajuste nacionalista da EPRDF.
Palavras-chave: Etiópia, Frente de Libertação do Povo do Tigré (TPLF), Frente 
Democrática Revolucionária do Povo Etíope (EPRDF),  
etiopianidade, oposição
Recebido  de junho de  “ceite  de abril de 
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the VIIIth Congreso Ibérico de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 
15th of June 2011. I’m grateful to the panelists, Alexandra Magnólia Dias and Elsa González Aimé, to the partici-
pants, to Ndubueze O. Nkume-Okorie and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier 
drafts of the paper. Naturally, I bear responsibility for any remaining shortfall.
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The fall of the military regime of the derg in May 1991 and the coming to pow-
er of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)2, not only meant the military victory of 
the later, but also the imposition of a certain conception of Ethiopian statehood. 
As a “byproduct of the Ethiopian student movement” (ESM) (Gebru, 2009, p. 82) 
the TPLF had forged its nationalist discourse in terms of the “national oppression 
thesis”, derived from the Stalinist theory of nationalities, as opposed to other 
competing interpretations of Ethiopia’s imperial period, i.e. the “nation-building 
thesis” (defended by the Ethiopian Democratic Union, EDU), the “colonial the-
sis” (notably defended by the Oromo Liberation Front), or the ”multinational 
Marxist thesis” (defended by other branches of the ESM like the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party, EPRP)3. The new 1995 constitution recognized the “Rights of 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” (NNPs)4, supported decentralization policies 
from which autonomous NNPs should beneit, while the new leadership violently 
condemned the preceding imperial and derg conceptions of Ethiopian nation-
hood, as the following extract of EPRDF program clearly shows: 
The chauvinist ruling classes adhere to the principle of “Itiopiawinnet” 
(Ethiopianness) which kills identity based on nationality. So they do not follow 
the principle of forming a nation-wide organization through a union of nation-
ality-based organizations. They aspire to form a dominant multi-nation organi-
zation composed of individuals from various nationalities and ethnic organiza-
tions that have betrayed the causes of their people and bowed to these chauvinists. 
Secessionists and narrow nationalist organizations do not want the fulilment of 
the peoples’ common interests. So, they, too, do not want to form a nation-wide 
organization together with other nationality-based organizations5.
As Clapham notes, the EPRDF “(…) therefore conceived Ethiopia in terms 
very diferent from those of previous regimes  Clapham, b, p. . Imperial 
symbols and heroes were in fact denigrated and new ones were made founding 
myths. For instance, the imperial lag was presented as a mere piece of cloth  
2 The EPRDF is a coalition formed under the auspice of the TPLF at the end of the . It took its deinitive form 
at the beginning of the 1990s and comprises four political parties: the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic 
Front.
3 See Merera (2003). On the origins of the TPLF, see Young (1997); and for the view of a former founding member 
of the Front, see Aregawi (2009).
4 Article 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The preceding derg regime 
had already started to organize a federal Ethiopian state under the Stalinist theory (creation of the Institute for 
Ethiopian Nationalities, and the national Shengo which oicially represented these nationalities according to the 
1989 constitution). But in practice, the derg continued to defend a centralized, violent and unitary conception of 
the Ethiopian nationhood (Clapham, 1989; Dias, 2008, pp. 175-176).
5 EPRDF (1993). Our Revolutionary Democratic Goals and the Next Step (1985 EC). Ethiopian Register, June 1996.
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and King of Kings Menilek II (r. 1889-1913), until then celebrated as a national 
hero and symbol of resistance against European colonialism, was condemned for 
his “genocidal campaigns” within its Ethiopian empire. The EPRDF thus revisited 
Ethiopian history from 1991 onward, considered the Aksum Empire as the his-
torical core of Ethiopia and dated the modern Ethiopian state back to Menilek 
II’s conquests in the nineteenth century (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58; Gascon, 2009; 
Clapham, 2002a).
However, less than a decade later, the batle of “dwa  was celebrated 
again as a national victory against colonialism, and giant pictures of the former 
emperors (including the derg’s leader Mengistu Haile Mariam) reappeared in 
Meskel Square, in Addis Ababa, at the occasion of the Festival of the Ethiopian 
Millennium (September 2007 - September 2008). The Festival celebrating “two 
thousand years of Ethiopian history” (according to the Ethiopian calendar) was 
also the occasion to give a tribute to the Ethiopian lag, since then presented as 
one of the strongest national symbols of Ethiopian “unity in diversity” and cel-
ebrated every year (Bach, 2013)6. 
The 1998-2000 war which opposed Ethiopia and Eritrea is most often pre-
sented as the decisive reason for this change in EPRDF’s nationalist discourse7. 
Ethiopianness8 would have been, since the war, surprisingly reactivated (Jacquin-
Berdal & Plaut, 2005, p. 109). Logically and interestingly, the question raised by 
observers has revolved around how the war afected the EPRDF project of remak-
ing the state along ethnic lines” (Dias, 2008, p. 208). Clearly, the 1998-2000 context 
of the war reactivated the resort to a national historiography inherited from the 
preceding regimes. On the one hand, as Tronvoll brilliantly demonstrated, “the 
discourses on identity in Ethiopia changed radically with the outbreak of the war. 
Suddenly, Ethiopianness rose like a phoenix from the revolutionary ashes, posi-
tioning itself at the centre of the political discourse on identity” (Tronvoll, 2009, 
p. 58). And on the other, in the aftermath of war “the emphasis on diversity and 
decentralization (…) was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity and on a 
revived and more salient centralizing trend” (Dias, 2008, p. 208). Assefa Fisseha 
went even further in describing the EPRDF’s nationalist “shift” after the war, and 
6 Since the irst Flag day in , the national Ethiopian lag has been celebrated every year, on diferent dates.
7 On the war, its causes and its aftermaths, see among others Tekeste & Tronvoll (2000); Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut 
(2005); Dias (2008). 
8  I shall deine Ethiopianness as a nationalist discourse based on a conception of the Ethiopian national identity 
as transcending people’s particular identities, inherited from the imperial times (Bureau, 1987) and aiming at 
legitimizing a “great” or “utopian Ethiopia” (Gascon, 1995). 
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more precisely after the 2001 split within the TPLF-EPRDF9, when he noted that 
“(…) the tone of discussion seems to have shifted toward the dangers of ‘narrow 
nationalism’ and the ‘manipulation of ethnic identity for parochial purposes’” 
(Assefa, 2006, p. 147). 
But this way of considering the pre-war and the post-war periods as coincid-
ing with two radically diverging and opposing discourses (ethnic-based before 
the war, and Pan-Ethiopian after the war) of the EPRDF leadership seems ques-
tionable when we focus on TPLF’s discourses before the war, and even before 
1991. In fact, except a very initial period during which the Tigrayan Front claimed 
independence for Tigray (the famous 1976 Manifesto), the TPLF fast reoriented its 
claims for a unitary and democratic Ethiopia within which the “nationalities” 
would be freed from oppression (Gebru, 2009, p. 86), and harshly condemned 
“narrow nationalism” (EPRDF, 1993). Further, in the early 1990s, Ethiopianness 
appeared as second-zone identity but still compatible with “primordial” ones. In 
Meles Zenawi’s own terms: “Ethiopianness” was then considered “a right, not 
an obligation” (Meles Zenawi, 1994). And after the 1998-2000 war, the annual 
celebrations of NNPs (festival of the NNPs) have shown that Ethiopianness has not 
replaced “primordial” identities in EPRDF’s nationalism.
Thus, the role played by the war must be tempered, for EPRDF’s centralized 
practice of power and the resilience of Ethiopianness in the early 1990s indicate 
that “ethnic federalism” was not such a radical turn as it could initially appear 
(Barnes & Osmond, 2005; Abbink, 2009). Beyond the formal discourses and ideo-
logical views inherited from the ESM, “ethnic federalism” has to be considered 
above all as a concrete political strategy in order to deal with diversity within 
the country on the one hand, and to deal with – or exclude – political opponents 
on the other. In fact, the great challenge facing the EPRDF at the beginning of 
the 1990s consisted in transforming an inherited empire into a “new” state. That 
meant proposing a regime capable of absorbing the inherent tension of (empire 
or) state-building resulting from the simultaneous process of “integrating and 
diferentiating  diferent groups ”urbank & Cooper, , p. . The ques-
tion raised by Burbank & Cooper is still very relevant in the Ethiopian case, in 
the imperial or current periods: “After the rapid expansion of the empire, how 
to build a lasting power?” (Burbank & Cooper, 2009, p. 15). Concerning politi-
cal opponents, ethnic-federalism  appeared to be an eicient way of excluding 
every group (and sometimes former enemies fought during the struggle, like 
9 The war exacerbated internal tensions irst within the TPLF and then in the other parties of the coalition. Meles 
Zenawi eventually imposed his views and TPLF “strong nationalist” members were expelled (like Gebru Asrate, 
former president of Tigray Region). See Medhane & Young (2003).
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EDU or EPRP former members) defending another conception of the Ethiopian 
nationhood or ethnic representation (Vaughan, 1994). Ethiopianness and ethnic-
federalism shall not be considered incompatible nationalisms that would have 
replaced each other alternatively, but rather two levels of EPRDF’s nationalism 
whose articulations have been determined by speciic circumstances. Tronvoll 
argued that “Ethiopian nationalism today (…) comes in the plural” in the war 
aftermaths (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 207). Here, I would like to show that TPLF-EPRDF 
nationalism was already plural before the 1998-2000 war.
”ased on oicial sources TPLF-EPRDF discourses, interviews) collected dur-
ing about twelve months of ieldwork conducted between  and , this 
article argues that a closer look at TPLF’s discourses and policies before and af-
ter 1991 suggests that “ethnic federalism” did not fundamentally call into ques-
tion Ethiopia’s unity even before the 1998-2000 war (except for the recognition 
of Eritrea’s independence in 1993). EPRDF leadership’s ideology has remained a 
lexible political tool for pragmatic and concrete control of the state, explaining 
why the resort to Ethiopianness and the myth of unity during the war was so eas-
ily reappropriated by the Ethiopian leadership. Further, I shall argue that the rise 
of a Pan-Ethiopian discourse after the war and during the 2005 general elections 
among opposition groups also explains this nationalist “shift”, showing that op-
position discourses also mater and inluence EPRDF’s discursive strategy.
The article is organised into two parts, in order to distinguish two distinct peri-
ods during which both a Pan-Ethiopian and a primordial conception of Ethiopian 
nationhood were articulated by TPLF-EPRDF. First, a focus on the struggle period 
against the derg and the beginning of the 1990s until the 1998-2000 war will show 
that the myth of Ethiopian unity was not rejected by the TPLF-EPRDF. The second 
shall demonstrate that not only the war but also the 2005 general election and its 
aftermaths played a very signiicant role in adjusting these two levels of national-
ism, i.e. “primordial” nationalism and Ethiopianness. 
From rebellion to government: playing with a multifaceted 
nationalism 1 -1
Following the fall of the derg regime and the coming of the TPLF/EPRDF to pow-
er, one can observe that the nation-building strategy as elaborated by this front 
stressed the “primordial” belonging to “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” as 
the basis of Ethiopians’ identity. Nevertheless, Ethiopianness soon reappeared 
in EPRDF’s discourses in the early 1990s. This multifaceted nationalism is to be 
explained by particular circumstances and also by the inheritance of a certain 
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perception of the state by the TPLF leadership, related to their ambition to reshape 
the Ethiopian state and nation, rather than destroying it. 
Rethinking Ethiopian nationhood: the inheritance of the “national 
oppression thesis”
After the fall of Mengistu’s regime, the Ethiopian “nationalities” became 
the core of a renewed conception of the Ethiopian nation derived from the 
”national oppression thesis” defended by the TPLF rebellion during the strug-
gle (1970s-1980s). The TPLF leadership thus remained devoted to their interpre-
tation of Ethiopian people and to their opposition against preceding regimes’ 
Ethiopianness considered the root cause of Ethiopia’s troubles. 
For instance, the batle of “dwa  March , symbolising the success of 
Ethiopia’s resistance against European colonisation, was still celebrated10. But its 
hero, emperor Menilek II, was not celebrated as a national hero anymore. Tribute 
was rather given to the Ethiopian “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” (NNPs) 
who fought Italian claims, while Menilek was condemned for the “genocides” 
he commited against Ethiopian NNPs. An imperial hero in the former regimes, 
Menilek II appeared as a criminal, responsible for many massacres during his 
military campaigns towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cen-
turies.
Oromo and Tigrayan martyrs were on the contrary celebrated as victims of 
these imperial expansions: the commemoration of the batle of Chelenqo  
which allowed Menilek to control the eastern commercial road to Harar gave 
tribute to “Oromo martyrs”. The “massacre of Annolee” during which, accord-
ing to the new oicial sources,   Oromo ighters were then said to have lost 
their lives11, was also commemorated every year from 1992 on, and the violent 
repression of Tigrayan uprising in 1943 (Weyane) by Haile Selassie’s regime after 
the Second World War were denounced for being “expansionist”, “violent” and 
“tyrannical”12. In fact, Haile Selassie’s and the derg regimes were both presented 
as imperial criminals, heirs of Menilek’s policies:
10 The batle occurred in the night and morning of the st of March, 1896. It opposed the Italian army and its locally 
recruited soldiers (askari) going south from their colony in Eritrea (about 10 000 men) to the huge Ethiopian impe-
rial army led by Menilek II and its generals (Ras) coming from all the Ethiopian empire (about 100 000 men). The 
Italian army was eventually defeated. See Maimire (1997); McClellan (1996, p. 63); see also Getachew & Paulos 
(2005). 
11 This number, as exaggerated as it appears, is quoted by Berhanu Legesse, “In memory of Oromos martyrs at 
Chelenko”, The Ethiopian Herald, 2nd April 1996.
12 Berhanu Legesse, “In memory of Oromos martyrs at Chelenko”, op. cit.; Getachew Kejela, “Annolee Martyrs 
Day commemorated”, The Ethiopian Herald, 7 January 1992. On the Weyane uprising, see Tareke (1996, pp. 89-124). 
110 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism
Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos  •  janeiro-junho de   •  , -
Menilek’s genocidal campaign against the Oromos has not so far been exposed 
since his successors (…) both the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes (…) sympathized 
with Menilek’s causes (…). Menilek took all inhuman measures to eliminate the 
Oromos from the face of the world13.
At the occasion of a press conference given in September 1992, Meles Zenawi, 
then President of the Transitional government (1991-1995) and leader of the TPLF/
EPRDF, exposed his vision of the new Ethiopian nation which was to be built. He 
explained how the new government aimed at building a new Ethiopian identity 
from below , which would emerge from irst  and real  identities of Ethiopian 
peoples, i.e. their “ethnic” belonging14. Meles Zenawi moreover stressed the fact 
that every Oromo, Tigrean or Kembata would consider himself irst as an Oromo, 
a Tigrean or a Kembata and only then as an Ethiopian. An Oromo would prefer 
being an Oromo rather than loose his identity: “People should be proud of their 
identity and ethnic identity” (…). “What incites disintegration is the view that 
we are all one”15.
These recurrent discourses from the beginning of the 1990s represent a quite 
radical turning point compared to the previous regimes which used the Adwa 
victory in order to unify the Ethiopian people in a context of civil (against the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, and then the TPLF/EPRDF and ailiates  and 
international wars (against Somalia at the beginning of the 1960s under Haile 
Selassie and later at the end of the 1970 under the derg). 
One can atribute this relative deconstruction of Ethiopianness by the new 
TPLF/EPRDF leadership and its reconstruction on the basis of NNPs to three main 
factors. First, the conception of the Ethiopian nation of the new leadership re-
mained strongly inluenced by their ideological background, i.e. the “national op-
pression thesis” inherited from the 1960s and 1970s (Merera, 2003). New regimes 
need renewed myths and mythologies in order to stress the contrast with past re-
gimes and build their power and legitimacy16. It is about demarcating themselves 
from the previous fallen regimes against which they fought. Second, one can say 
13 “Menilek’s genocidal campaign”, The Ethiopian Herald, 5 January 1992.
14 “President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists”, The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, and 25 
September . These ideas were conirmed in an interview of Meles Zenawi by Donald Levine published the 
same month. See Levine (1992). 
15 “President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists”, The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, 25 September 
1992.
16 The derg also defended the idea of “unity in diversity” and promoted, during the very last years of the regime, 
a federal reconiguration of Ethiopian state based on the recognition of the diferent nations. ”ut although it 
created the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in  in order to list the diferent nationalities 
that had to be represented in the national Assembly (Shengo  from  on, the groups so identiied had no real 
power and the Shengo remained an appendix of the derg. As Clapham writes, in post-1991, “the Stalinist theory of 
nationalities had life only after death” (Clapham, 2002b, p. 25). 
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that TPLF/EPRDF’s leadership had to satisfy other national groups (Oromos, Afar, 
etc.  with whom they had been ighting during the struggle and who were now 
expecting a reward for such alliances (autonomy, independence). Finally, the 
relatively peaceful regional context did not necessitate a broad Ethiopian mobili-
sation against an “external” enemy. National “enemies” were at the moment just 
those who opposed such a deconstruction of Ethiopianness within Ethiopia17. In 
fact, this new strategy of state- and nation-building implied an ethnic interpre-
tation of all Ethiopian conlicts, as the new leadership ideologically considered 
economic, social and political marginalization of NNPs (here synonymous of eth-
nic, even if this term is barely used by the former guerrillas) as the main source 
of conlicts under previous regimes. For them, the eradication of any national 
“oppression” through “multinational federalism” and the rethinking of the no-
tions of state and nation in terms of NNPs had to respect Ethiopian diversities and 
preserve the country from any future conlict18.
Ethiopianness: a right, not an obligation  Meles Zenawi, 1 4  
But the idea of Ethiopianness, while strongly rejected in internal EPRDF papers, 
was not that radically condemned publicly, and even progressively increased 
again from the middle of the 1990s. In fact, it would be excessive to conclude 
from these irst observations that Ethiopianness purely and simply disappeared 
as from 1991 in EPRDF’s discourses. Indeed, the Ethiopia-scale national discourse 
was not totally abandoned at the beginning of the 1990s, although it then ap-
peared like a “second class identity”, beyond the “Rights of Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples”. It is also worth noting the ambiguity created by the coexistence of 
a dual identity after : while the domestic citizenship was deined in terms 
of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, it had to coexist with a remaining interna-
tional Ethiopian identity (Dias, 2008, pp. 144-152)19.
During the transitional period (1991-1995), rather than a complete rejection of 
Ethiopianness, one could observe a complex articulation of these two conceptions 
of Ethiopian nation. While primordial identities got a legal and constitutional sta-
tus (Transition Charter and then the Art. 39 of the 1995 Constitution), Ethiopianness 
17 Opposing such a new vision of the Ethiopian nation and defending an Ethiopia-broad identity, the All-Amhara 
People’s Organization was thus tendentiously accused of sponsoring “war” and was erased from the political 
scene.
18 See “No alternative to peace and democracy”, The Ethiopian Herald, 21 January, 1992; and “President Meles 
briefs local, foreign journalists on current Ethiopia situation”, The Ethiopian Herald, 2 February 1993. On the 
consequences of such an externally deined and imposed identity in terms of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, 
see Abbink (1998).
19 For a stimulating development on the implications of such an ambiguous identity and the consequences of 
the 2003 Proclamation No. 378 on Ethiopian (and Eritrean) nationality after the 1998-2000 war, see Dias (2008), 
especially chapter 4.
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was relegated to an identity of secondary importance. “Ethiopianness [has be-
come] a right, not an obligation”, declared Meles Zenawi as early as 199420. When 
journalists asked him about the coming evolution of Ethiopian citizenship, Meles 
Zenawi declared in 1992:
Previous approach [derg] was […] to deny his nation, nationality identity in order 
to be an Ethiopian. […] The greatest danger to unity is not accepting the fact that 
we can jointly retain and ascertain our Ethiopian identity while at the same time 
speaking our own languages, wearing our ethnic costumes and administering our 
own respective regions […]. If the danger is done away with, federalism will only 
further strengthen Ethiopia’s unity and not lead to disintegration21.
I just can’t comprehend why being organised on the basis of nationalities and the 
respect on nations and nationalities should conlict with the notion of being an 
Ethiopian […]. It is possible to be both an Ethiopian and one’s own ethnic origin, 
why is it that we insist that he chooses one of the two? […]. Why is it that he can’t 
be both? When he retains both identities, he can at the same time be a Kembata and 
an Ethiopian, an Oromo and an Ethiopian, as well as a Tigrean and an Ethiopian all 
at the same time […]. Most of the time no person desires to lose his identity22.
Actually, the EPRDF has been proposing a new vision of Ethiopian identity, 
where primordial identities can coexist with an imperial inherited Ethiopianness 
without being mutually exclusive. Several internal and external events, as well as 
long term causes, explain the fast puting in perspective of the ethnic discourse 
and the slight rehabilitation of Ethiopianness as from the middle of the 1990s. 
Explaining the national compromise: conjunctural stakes and long term 
inheritances 
The strained relationship between the EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF) is one important reason explaining the resilience of Ethiopianness in the 
irst half of the s. The former Oromo ally during the struggle boycoted the 
1992 elections, later left the Transitional government and took up arms against 
the TPLF/EPRDF. Dissatisied with the leading group’s desire to monopolize the 
political process and rig elections, the OLF reiterated its demands for the inde-
pendence of the Oromo “colonized” peoples. But as the Oromo state represented 
20 “Ethiopianness, a right, not obligation: Meles”, The Ethiopian Herald, 11 February, 1994. It is for instance reveal-
ing that conlicts are no longer considered to be ethnic from then on. In September , Meles Zenawi himself 
declaring in 1994: “It is inaccurate to talk about ethnic strife in Ethiopia”, Interview of Meles Zenawi, Eye Witness, 
The Ethiopian Herald, 4 September 1994.
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what was becoming the federation’s biggest and richest region in the middle of 
which the capital city, Addis Ababa, stood23, the TPLF/EPRDF had no choice but to 
calm ethnic tensions and regional demands in order to avoid Ethiopia’s implo-
sion. ”y recognizing ethnic conlict as a reality, the government would have been 
accused of implementing the same oppressive policies as the former regimes. 
This may partly explain why the ethnic discourse was tempered from the middle 
of the 1990s onward, in order to maintain the still fragile unity of the territory and 
to optimise the economic potential in a country that had to be rebuilt. 
A second event may have played in important role in the preservation of 
Ethiopianness: the conlict in neighbouring Somalia. “fter the fall of Siyad ”arre 
in , the diferent groups in power could not reach any agreement for a peace-
ful and inclusive transition. This led to the “collapse” of the young Somali state. 
Within that period, the Ethiopian government press presented this conlict as 
emerging from inter-clan tensions and resulting in a state of “chaos” and “anar-
chy . This vision of the Somali conlict probably scared the Ethiopian leadership 
which had the task of stabilizing the country after more than ifteen years of a 
cruel civil war. Ethnic tensions may have carried a strong potential for violence 
very hard to deal with. Ethiopianness then appeared very useful as a common 
Ethiopian sense of belonging able to deal with “unity in diversity”.
The 1994 massacres in Rwanda could also explain the inertia of Ethiopianness 
as a third and external event. The genocide in Rwanda conirmed the danger in 
institutionalizing ethnicity and the politicization and manipulation of the later 
when deined from above . In fact, this episode of Rwanda contemporary his-
tory was very present in Ethiopia as the government sent a contingent to par-
ticipate in the United Nations peacekeeping mission there. Even recently, two 
months before the  general elections in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi justiied the 
banning of two radio stations (Voice of America and Deutsche Welle) by accusing 
them of inciting hatred, the Prime minister explicitly comparing the stations to 
Radio Mille Collines, and underscoring the important role played by the radio in 
the genocide (Bach, 2011, p. 488). This explicit reference to the Rwanda genocide 
was already very present in anti-opposition discourses from the EPRDF during the 
2005 general elections, against Ethiopian opponents (ICG, 2009, p. 9).
Furthermore, this evolution of the Ethiopian nation-building process and 
TPLF/EPRDF’s conception of the Ethiopian nation can also be explained by the 
TPLF’s perception of the Ethiopian state and their pragmatic strategies during the 
struggle. That actually reveals the complexity of TPLF’s nationalism itself. In fact, 
23 According to the 2007 Census published by the Central Statistical Agency, the Oromo region covers about 
280 000 km2 and contains 36,5 % of the Ethiopian population.
114 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism
Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos  •  janeiro-junho de   •  , -
from the 1970s, TPLF’s nationalism was built on the tension between historical 
Ethiopianness and the ideological ”national oppression thesis”. Except a brief 
period of hesitation at the beginning of the movement’s formation during which 
the young Tigrayan front claimed independence for the Tigray region (cf. the 
Manifesto of 1976), their objective then shifted: the control of the Ethiopian state. 
This shift became clearer when the Shire, “dwa and “xum group , ighting for 
an autonomous Tigray within Ethiopia, overpowered an internal dissident group 
calling for independence. The creation of the EPRDF, under the auspices of the 
TPLF, and above all the decision taken by the Front to struggle beyond Tigray in 
order to liberate the whole Ethiopia in the second half of the 1980s (at the occa-
sion of the foundation of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray within the TPLF) 
represent an important step from Tigray nationalism to Ethiopian nationalism 
(Aregawi, 2009, pp. 176-185; Young, 1997, pp. 138-139). As Tronvoll noted, once 
the Tigray region was liberated from the derg armies at the end of the 1980s, this 
decision to continue the struggle until Addis Ababa had two major implications: 
First, the Front had to readjust its ideological platform so that the revolution of 
Tigrayanness and political autonomy could also include an Ethiopian solution to 
the problem of other suppressed ‘nationalities’ […] And, secondly, it had to es-
tablish alliances with other ethnic fronts outside Tigray in order to carry on the 
military struggle on ‘foreign’ ethnic soil (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 55).
This evolution is actually not surprising. The Tigrayan leadership had con-
demned Menilek II who was accused of having “abandoned” parts of Tigray to 
the Italians (Hamassien and the Northern part of the Mereb river) after the bat-
tle of Adwa (1896). Haile Selassie was equally condemned for the repressions of 
any atempt of Tigrayan’s resistance against his state-building enterprise cf. the 
Weyane uprising in 1943; Gebru, 1996). But the Tigrayan rebels and elites consid-
ered Tigray itself not only as part of the Ethiopian state, but as its historical core 
(Medhane, 1999, pp. 1-64; Gascon, 2006, p. 75). In fact, Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889), 
former King of Kings of Ethiopia, just before Menilek II, originated from Tigray. 
In 1872, he was crowned in Axum, the religious and former centre of the empire, 
hence reinventing a tradition abandoned since the crowning of Yassou IV in the 
same place in 1693. Yohannes IV thus conirmed the moving of the Ethiopian 
political, religious and symbolic state “centre” to Tigray at the end of the XIXth cen-
tury, anchoring the Solomonic ascendency of its authority (Ancel, 2006; Henze, 
, p. . He thus deinitely connected what was becoming the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church to state-building in order to legitimize his power. Ras Alula, 
the head of Yohannes’ army and defender of Tigray against both external and 
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internal threats, did not get any oicial title as a hero at the Ethiopian level, but 
has remained a major hero in contemporary Tigrayan memories (Erlich, 1996). 
Besides, his statue in Asmara was destroyed just after EPLF took power (1991) 
(Medhane, 1999).
Tigray was seen to stand at the core of Ethiopia’s long-term history, a frontier 
region between two state- and nation-building processes, the emerging Eritrean 
nation-state in the North and the Ethiopian empire in the South. For instance, the 
TPLF atachment clearly appears through the names given to military ofensives 
during the struggle against the derg. While the later launched the Operation 
Adwa” in 1988 and the “Operations Aksum I” and “Aksum II” in 1988 and 1989 
against Eritrean and Tigrayan Fronts (Gebru, 2009), the TPLF/EPRDF appropriated 
the image of the King of Kings Tewodros II (r. 1865-1868) by naming its mas-
sive and determined ofensive against Mengistu’s armies Operation Tewodros  
(Fontrier, 1999, pp. 287-294). By calling the military operation “Tewodros” (in-
stead of Yohannes or Alula, which would have narrowly referred to Tigray), 
the Tigrayan movement used a federating image of the founder of “modern” 
Ethiopia and sent a strong signal to its Ethiopian allies (like EPRDF groups among 
others) in order to dispel the remaining doubts of the 1976 Manifesto. 
The following extracts published in 1977 in the press department of the TPLF 
Vanguard is revealing of such a strategy: 
Contrary to Ethiopia’s false claim 3 000 years of history originating before the era 
of the Axumite Kingdom (…) the ancient Kingdom was the Kingdom of Axum 
and not the Kingdom of Ethiopia. From the fall of Axum and the advent of Italian 
colonialism the people of Eritrea lived under chains of feudal iefdoms, in constant 
resistance to foreign aggressions24. 
”y referring to “xum and by geting rid of the Solomonic iliation, the TPLF/
EPRDF was redeining the historicity of the Ethiopian state and Ethiopianness, 
but not rejecting it. By replacing Solomon and the Queen of Sheba with Axum, 
Ethiopian history “lost” 1 000 years of history25. It made it possible for the TPLF to 
defend and place itself in the core of Ethiopia’s long-term history. Already, during 
the struggle against the derg, the TPLF/EPRDF project had acquired a strong Pan-
Ethiopian scale aimed at unifying Ethiopian nations by using and reinterpreting 
the Ethiopian empire’s mythologies and heroes. Finally, it revealed the weight 
and usefulness of Ethiopian imperial history during the struggle, thus explaining 
24 Vanguard, April 1977, p. 3.
25 A. Gascon (2009) wrote this particular relevant remark: “L’actuelle république …  a amputé   ans de son histoire 
préférant se référer au royaume d’Aksum [plutôt qu’au mythe salomonien] dont l’existence historique est indéniable”. 
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the capacity of post-1991 leadership to clearly resort to strong Ethiopian symbols 
in the course of the 1990s, especially from 1998-2000 until today. Combining the 
”national oppression thesis” with Ethiopian imperial symbols and nationalism, 
Tigrayan rebels were not ighting against the Ethiopian state, but for the Ethiopian 
state – contrary to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front which contested the 
Ethiopian state and Ethiopianness and (re)invented an Eritrean identity anchored 
in Italian colonization within the colonial frontiers.
Thus, the combination of imperial Ethiopianness with “Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples”, i.e. the two main scales of Ethiopian nationalisms, rather than 
two sequences of Ethiopian nation-building or rather than two conceptions of 
Ethiopian nationhood rejecting each other, dates back to the struggle period 
where they already coexisted. This explains why a strong reactivation of the Pan-
Ethiopian nationalism by the EPRDF was possible (and worked) when the war 
with Eritrea broke out in 1998. 
The 1998-2000 war and the 2005 elections:  
balancing Ethiopianness and NNPs 
Eritrea gained independence in 1993 after the struggle opposing the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front led by Issayas Afeworki against the derg. The EPLF 
has remained in power since then. The 1998-2000 war between the TPLF and the 
EPLF regimes was unexpected, even though the relationship between the former 
Tigrayan and Eritrean Fronts went through some crisis during the struggle 
(Young, 1996). Within a few weeks, a boundary clash in contested territories fast 
became a large scale war in which both countries lost in total about 100, 000 sol-
diers (Tekeste & Tronvoll, 2000; Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut, 2004; Dias, 2008). From 
the beginning of the conlict, the EPRDF elites clearly adopted a renewed discourse 
of Ethiopianness using symbols and myths used by the previous regimes and 
relatively undermined since . This tendency was reairmed after the  
general elections in which opposition groups defending a “real Ethiopianness” 
obtained some successes. That eventually led to a readjusted nation-building 
strategy in which Ethiopianness and NNPs have been more equally balanced. 
The 1998-2000 war: reactivating a strong Ethiopianness 
Tronvoll has demonstrated the impact of the 1998-2000 war on “the formation 
and conceptualisation of identities in Ethiopia”, and the (re)construction of en-
emies’ and allies’ images in its aftermaths (Tronvoll, 2009). I would like to focus 
here on the perspective of the Ethiopian government as nation-builder, and on 
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the way some national symbols, rejected by TPLF/EPRDF rulers at the beginning of 
the 1990s, were then re-appropriated and used by these post-1991 Ethiopian rul-
ers in order to ight against a new  Eritrean enemy.
Empires-, states- and nation-building is marked by some pivotal events refer-
ring to diferent levels of nationalism, their re activations depending on particu-
lar contexts. The liberation  struggle and the ight against imperial and derg’s 
nationalism gave sense to a nationalism based on Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples after 1991. The war against Eritrea meant resorting to broader federat-
ing symbols and pivotal events stressing the “unity” and solidarity of Ethiopian 
peoples. That implied the increasing use of another dimension of nationalism at 
state level, inherited from the imperial period – which, once again, had not disap-
peared since . These diferent nationalisms do not switch places with each 
other, but became articulated so that the Pan-national repertories embraced those 
who consider themselves as Tigrayan, Oromo, Kembata and Ethiopian, or those 
who felt they belonged to both ethnic and Ethiopian identities. 
In this context, the batle of “dwa appeared a very powerful pivotal event 
for the Ethiopian leadership in 1998-2000. In fact, it symbolized the union of 
Ethiopian peoples in their resistance against external enemies. In the 1990s, the 
commemorations of the batle of “dwa were occasions to celebrate Ethiopian 
NNPs. Then, in 1996, while Ethiopianness was quietly reactivated as noted above, 
a great celebration was organised to mark the centenary of Adwa victory against 
Italian aggressors, showing a growing interest for such an imperial event26. The 
outbreak of the -  war deinitely rehabilitated the symbol.
The most illustrative fact of the reappropriation of Adwa by the TPLF/EPRDF is 
undoubtedly the 1st of March 1999, the date on which one of the most important 
Ethiopian ofensives against Eritrean troops in the disputed area of ”adme was 
launched (Operation Sunset . One could read on the irst page of the governmen-
tal newspaper the following day: “It is propitious that the Badme victory was 
scored just as Ethiopians were preparing to observe the 103rd anniversary of the 
”atle of “dwa today 27. The next day, the 3rd of March 1999, the same newspaper 
published a special issue on the two events. “t the top of the irst page, one could 
read: “dwa Victory Day Colourfully Celebrated , and at the botom of the same 
26 See “Adwa centenary worthier than commemorations of Normandy landings, V-Day”, and “We are all children 
of Adwa (A. Triulzi)”, The Ethiopian Herald, 27 February, 1996. See also the proceedings of the conference given at 
this occasion (Ahmad & Richard, 1998). For a historical and general view on the event, see Getachew & Paulos 
(2005). 
27 “Operation Sunset culminates in success”, The Ethiopian Herald, 2nd March, 1999. 
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page: ”adme Victory – “ Heroic Spirit Kindling . This Double Victory!  was 
celebrated during the whole of the following week28.
The 1998-2000 war did not only prove the strength of Ethiopianness, but also 
its usefulness for the Ethiopian political elite in place. The conlict against Eritrea 
incited the Ethiopian government to resort to the “colonial” memory, presenting 
the Eritrean regime as the heir of the Italian invaders. The TPLF/EPRDF endorsed 
the role of defender of the Ethiopian state, as did the preceding regimes against 
European countries. The use of the Adwa memory further revealed the inertia 
of imperial history and its symbolism, showing how the same set of mytholo-
gies could be used in diferent ways, in diferent contexts and for diferent po-
litical objectives (Girardet, 1986, pp. 9-24). Badme, since then, has been laden 
with such a strong mythology that the Ethiopian government could not allow 
to lose the place – even though it has been situated in Eritrea according to the 
decision given by the Independent Border Commission of the United Nations in 
2002 (Lyons, 2006). This partly explains why the Ethiopian government has been 
systematically obstructing the implementation of this decision. Badme, as Adwa, 
has become a symbol of the Ethiopian nation and its martyrs, showing how old 
imperial places combine with new ones as markers of national and territorial 
memories. The former empire thus remains connected with the present, with the 
current Ethiopian state.
This connection was also obvious at the occasion of a new symbolic event as-
sociated with TPLF/EPRDF’s own victory: Ginbot  (28 May). This date marks the 
fall of the derg regime and the entry of EPRDF’s troops into Addis Ababa in 1991, 
and has become a pivotal event as a national celebration day still symbolising the 
rebels’ ight as well as the source of their legitimacy. The th of May 1999 also 
connects the past and the present through a war, as the celebration poster pub-
lished at the occasion established a direct link between Ginbot  and the national 
military ofensive. In fact, on the poster published for  May , one could read 
in the “8” of “28”: “Operation Sunset”29. TPLF/EPRDF leadership has thus superim-
posed its own victory against the regime on national resistance, hence operating 
a double and negative assimilation: on the one hand, Pan-Ethiopian nationalism 
(Ethiopianness) and TPLF/EPRDF’s mythology are becoming confused, and on the 
other hand Eritrea is assimilated into the former regime of the derg. In a violent 
conlictual context, allies and enemies are thus redeined, thanks to assimilations 
and oppositions, using and rejecting the Ethiopian past at the same time in order 
to reinvent the party and state legitimacy. Adwa, Ginbot , Operation Sunset and 
28 “Double victory celebrated”, The Ethiopian Herald, 9th March, 1999.
29 The Ethiopian Herald, 28th May 1999.
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Badme enter the core of a reinvented Ethiopian mythology, showing once again 
how imperial Ethiopianness and the new nationalism based on the “Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples” have to be considered as interdependent instead of 
opposed. The war against Eritrea has reconciled the Ethiopian empire with the 
post-1991 revolutionary state, as well as their respective nationalisms.
The aftermath of the 2005 general elections: balancing “multinational 
federalism” and Ethiopianness 
In 1991, the relative change of national identity and the subsequent revision 
of Ethiopia’s history at the beginning of the 1990s appeared more controversial 
than the implementation of the federal system itself (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58). In 
fact, multinational federalism was strongly condemned by observers for being 
the denial  of Ethiopianist feeling  supposedly born in “dwa, puting at risk 
national unity (Worku, 1993; Aberra, 1995) and eventually leading to the “coun-
try’s disintegration” (Maimire, 2005, p. 253; Getachew & Paulos, 2005). 
Very early, political movements defending Ethiopia’s unity expressed their 
concern about the “ethnic divisions” Ethiopia would be facing (Levine, 1992, 
p. . Three main arguments structured the opposition’s criticism then: the irst 
two were based on Eritrean and Somalian experiences, and the fear that Ethiopia 
would follow and disintegrate; the third one underscored the risk represent-
ed by a coming secession of the Oromo region from Ethiopia. This was for in-
stance the case of the All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), or the Ethiopian 
Democratic Unity Party (EDUP), whose political programs were based on the uni-
ty of a “Greater Ethiopia” and the defence of a strong Ethiopianness. The AAPO 
was one of the most representative of these groups. Created in 1992 and chaired 
by Asrat Woldeyes who defended a unitary Ethiopia and condemned EPRDF’s 
multinational project, AAPO strongly opposed the independence of Eritrea, one 
of its main slogans being: “One Nation, One Country”30. Haylu Shawel, then re-
sponsible for external relations of the movement, declared: 
Since childhood, we have been told that we are Ethiopians. Being Ethiopian is the 
only thing we know. But those forces allergic to this idea have left no stone un-
turned to incite inter-ethnic conlict in our country. “ll these atempts have failed. 
This was because the Ethiopian people have never fought wars along ethnic lines. 
They showed great maturity in the face of investigations which could have possi-
bly led to great sufering elsewhere … . “t times, I fear that a situation like that of 
Lebanon or Yugoslavia could develop in Ethiopia (…)31.
30 “AAPO leaders speak out”, Ethiopian Review, March 1993, pp. 15-16. 
31 Ibid., p. 16. 
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Parties defending the Ethiopian state’s and nation’s unity, and criticising mul-
tinational federalism have not disappeared. Quite logically, they just reappeared 
and increased after 2000, in the post-war context. In fact, opponents defending a 
unitary Ethiopia found in the war the occasion to legitimize their thesis and prove 
they were “right” at the beginning of the 1990s when they warned of imminent 
new conlicts, for which multinational federalism was accused of being responsi-
ble. This resurgence of a Pan-Ethiopian nationalist discourse clearly emerged at 
the occasion of the 2005 regional and federal elections and got a new dimension. 
The May/August 2005 general elections can be considered as the freest and 
fairest since the fall of the derg. For the irst time in Ethiopian history, debates 
between diferent and opposed  parties were publicised and aired on TV and 
Radio, thus giving opposition groups the occasion to publicly broadcast their 
views and programs (Schmidt, 2005; Abbink, 2006; Gilkes, 2007). The most re-
membered event symbolizing this opening of the political space may be the TV 
debate which opposed the Deputy Prime Minister, Addissu Legesse, to Berhanu 
Nega, one leader of the most important coalition of opposition groups, the 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, or Kinidjit)32. Many Ethiopians that I 
met these last years remember the feeling of freedom they felt for the irst time 
when they peacefully gathered at Meskel Square and contested EPRDF’s power. 
But the greatest hope also turned out to be the greatest deception. The CUD 
won 137 of the 138 seats of Addis Ababa city Council. It thus had the majority 
in the regional and federal level (CUD won 109 seats in the House of People’s 
Representatives), which marked a turning point in Ethiopian political history 
(the opponents had been almost absent in the lower House till then). 172 seats 
were won by the whole opposition, 372 remaining to the EPRDF and its ailiated 
parties. This was a big surprise for the EPRDF which did not expect losing that 
much, particularly in the rural regions. But in the aftermath of the ballot, the CUD 
leadership and other opposition groups contested the electoral fairness and peo-
ple began to demonstrate in the streets. 
32 Formed in October 2004, the main components of the CUD were: the All-Ethiopian Unity Party, the United 
Ethiopia Democratic Party-Medhin, the Ethiopian Democratic League, and Rainbow Ethiopia (see Abbink, 
2006; ICG, 2009). The United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF, or Hibrät) led by the Addis Ababa University 
Professors Merera Gudina (Oromo National Congress) and Beyene Petros (Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal 
Party), represents the second most important coalition challenging EPRDF’s power in 2005. Contrary to the CUD, 
the UEDF did not reject multinational federalism, but condemned what they considered authoritarian practices 
and EPRDF’s monopolization of power. UEDF is composed of Ethiopian-based parties (mainly in the Southern 
regions) as well as exiled groups (in the United States). The coalition strongly criticizes EPRDF for the issue of the 
1998-2000 war, considering that Ethiopia should have rejected the 2000 Algiers Agreement (ending the war) and 
(re)integrate the “lost” region.
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Thousands of CUD and opposition members33, journalists, human rights activ-
ists were arrested and accused of national “treason”, and about two hundred 
civilians were killed by security forces while demonstrating in Addis Ababa and 
in the main Ethiopian cities between June and November 2005 (ICG, 2009; Piguet, 
2006; Abbink, 2006; Tronvoll & Hagmann, 2012)34. Some opposition leaders were 
freed in September  due to the combined inluence of a mediation organized 
by an Ethiopian “council of elders” and pressure from the US Administration and 
Congress. These opponents were “pardoned” and released before the opening 
of the National Festival of the Millennium in August and September 200735, after 
having oicially recognized their responsibility  for the violent events a couple 
a years before. 
The impressive electoral progress of CUD in the Addis Ababa city council elec-
tions, in the Amhara region and in the House of People’s Representatives is a 
concrete illustration of the appeal of a strong discourse based on Ethiopianness 
which regained some credit during the 1998-2000 war. The issue of Eritrea was at 
the core of this vision defended by the CUD in 2005. EPRDF’s leadership was nota-
bly criticized for the way they “abandoned” what most of CUD leadership consid-
ered an Ethiopian region , irst in , and then in . It is then not surpris-
ing to ind Haylu Shawel – AAPO chairman after the death of Asrate Woldeyes in 
jail – chairing the Coalition for Unity and Democracy in / .
The  events thus conirm the resurgence of a Pan-Ethiopian unitary na-
tionalism rejecting multinational federalism since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea created an opportunity for such a movement 
for a political revival, which has remained prominent since then. The result of 
the 2010 general elections (EPRDF won 99,6% of all HPR seats) illustrates not only 
how the EPRDF has been able to react since , but also the di culty of the 
opponents to federate out of this national vision – in a political context marked 
by EPRDF’s strong control of the whole electoral process36. Five years later, argu-
ments and repertories elaborated by CUD and parties like Ethiopian Democratic 
Party in the  campaign clearly echoed those ive years earlier. The following 
declaration of Lidetu Ayalew (EDePa, led by Lidetu Ayalew, a former CUD mem-
33 “mong those arrested were: ”erhanu Nega, Mesin Wolde-Maryam, ”ertukan Mideksa, Haylu Shawel, etc.
34 See also “Ethiopia legislative elections 2005”, European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report, 
htp://www.eueom.eu/iles/dmile/FinalReport.pdf
35 Between September 2007 and September 2008, the Festival of the Millennium celebrated the 2000 years of 
Ethiopian history. Initiated by the government, it was the occasion to celebrate what was presented by EPRDF 
oicials as the Ethiopian Renaissance. 
36 Human Rights Watch, One hundred ways of puting pressure  Violations of freedom expression and association in 
Ethiopia, March 2010. 
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ber) during a TV electoral debate aired on Ethiopian Television in February 2010 
illustrates that continuity: 
Multiparty system will never be implemented as we like as long as there are politi-
cal parties which are based on ethnicity in accordance with the constitution. There 
should be a political party that believes in the unity of all Ethiopian ethnic groups 
and individual rights37.
During another debate, Lidetu Ayelew explicitly resorted to the argument of 
the risk of fragmentation. He irst showed a map representing Ethiopia, and then 
a second one representing Ethiopia without the Oromo region, declaring:
Sorry to say but Ethiopia is at risk. The bad experiences we have come across38 can 
evidently justify our fear. Let us think and imagine Ethiopia without Oromia – the 
biggest and richest regional state. If a demand for secession generates from such 
wealthy portion of Ethiopia, you can imagine what Ethiopia would look like39.
Ato Legesse spoke for Kinidjit and, like EDePa, defended a united Ethiopia, 
just as the Coalition did in 200540: “Ethnic federalism, we think, will erode togeth-
erness and unity, which in turn leads to identity complex. We are not underesti-
mating ethnic groups at all, no ever. We are only against ethnic federalism”41.
If we wish to understand the post-war evolution of nation-building as de-
ined and expressed by EPRDF’s leadership, we need to take into account the suc-
cess of the Pan-Ethiopian Kinidjit in the 2005 general election, and more broadly 
the resurgence of this persistent Pan-Ethiopian agenda defended by a large part 
of the opposition42. CUD’s nationalism being an obvious inheritance of imperial 
Ethiopianness, the EPRDF had few options but to (re)appropriate and reinvent 
the national set of mythologies which is a complex mix between myths inherited 
from imperial, derg and current regimes. Through this discursive strategy, the 
EPRDF aimed at federating Ethiopians which partly explains why diferent levels 
of nationalism are so clearly superimposed in the present day Ethiopia. 
37 Lidetu Ayalew, Six-party debate, Ethiopian Television, “Democracy, election and multipartism in Ethiopia”, 
February . These abstracts are unoicial translations from “mharic. 
38 This must refer to Eritrea’s independence in 1993. 
39 Six-party debate, Ethiopian Television, “Federalism and decentralisation”, First Part, February 2010. 
40 After the 2005 elections, the CUD disintegrated and many parties left the Coalition (Lidetu Ayalew’s Ethiopian 
Democratic Unity Party was one of them), so that the CUD in 2005 is far from being as strong as in 2005. 
41 Six-party debate, Ethiopian Television, “Federalism and decentralisation”, First Part, February 2010.
42 Many opposition parties do not reject federalism or ethnic federalism. This was for instance the case of the 
coalition EUDP (Hibrät) in 2005, or the new coalition Medrek (“Forum”) in 2010 whose main leaders were professors 
Merera Gudina and Beyene Petros. These groups criticize EPRDF’s policies and “authoritarian practices”, but not 
“ethnic federalism” per se. 
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Conclusion 
Anchored in the ”national oppression thesis” inherited from the Ethiopian 
student movement, the EPRDF leadership has been defending a conception of 
Ethiopian society structured “from below” and rooted in ascribed primordial 
identities. That representation determined the new discourses aiming at sup-
porting nation- and state-building in post-1991 Ethiopia (Merera, 2006; Vaughan, 
2011). Nevertheless, the radical deconstruction of Ethiopianness expressed to ex-
clude competing political groups was fast reactivated. As Tronvoll writes, 
the oicially sanctioned nationalism designed and expressed by the EPRDF gover-
nment was not powerful enough to neutralise other competing nationalist discour-
ses, creating a complex and sometimes contradictory context of nationalist expres-
sions (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 207). 
The developments above conirm that the -  war is essential but not 
suicient to explain the complex reconigurations, adaptations and reinventions 
of Ethiopian nationalisms since 1991 (and before). The Ethiopian case very inter-
estingly illustrates Girardet’s idea that large “mythological sets” or “constella-
tions of myths  remain despite the diferent ways their inherent symbols, images 
or heroes can be used and reinvented (Girardet, 1986, pp. 12-20). Rather than a 
research of a “real past” or historical “truth”, myths and mythologies thus have 
to be studied above all for what they tell about the present. 
These articulations of Pan-Ethiopianness and primordial identities have to be 
understood out of the main challenge of state- and nation-builders consisting 
in transforming an empire into a “modern” state. That process has implied the 
need to reinvent the Ethiopian nation in order to ind a way to federate diferent 
groups in a coherent national project, but also in order to control them (Burbank 
& Cooper, 2008, pp. 500-501). The EPRDF had to deal with the tension between 
integration and diferentiation rooted in Menilek’s conquests from the end of the 
19th century. The current polymorphous nationalism (like all nationalisms may 
be) tends to resolve the “persistent dilemma of empires”: how to incorporate dif-
ferent populations in a coherent political entity by maintaining, at the same time, 
distinctions and hierarchies on which domination is based. The Ethiopian case 
proves how thin the line remains between fallen empires and the states which 
replace them (Bertrand, 2006; Brown, 2011), and how problematic the challenge 
remains.
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